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Rethinking Radicalization
By Randy Borum
Senior Editor, Journal of Strategic Security
Over the course of the past decade, the United States and its international 
partners have vacillated between waging war on al-Qaida, waging war on 
terrorism, combating violent extremism, engaging in a battle of ideas, and 
attempting to win hearts and minds. In a series of hard-learned lessons, 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces confronted the realization 
that, even as they were steadily removing bad guys from battlespace, the 
adversary forces were continuing to replenish and expand. It seemed nec-
essary to look upstream for possible ways to stem the flow of new fighters 
and supporters.
One result of that upstream reconnaissance was the idea of focusing on 
"radicalization"—the process of developing extremist ideologies and 
beliefs—as a precursor to terrorism. It was assumed that if we were trying 
to counter an ideologically driven adversary, then mitigating or eliminat-
ing the power of the ideology would diminish the adversary's ranks. A less 
belligerent population and a less volatile operating environment might 
even be added benefits. It was a reasonable theory.
But distinguishing between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
became a bit confusing. Although a global "war on terrorism" had been 
declared, the conflicts on the ground were much more local. War-fighters 
and analysts alike observed that terrorism was a tactic, not a clearly 
defined enemy. Indeed, forces were not broadly patrolling the world look-
ing for any hints of terrorism of every kind. The military forces were 
mired in concentrated, complex, protracted, armed conflicts with adver-
saries who used—among other things—terrorist tactics. Security and 
intelligence services were attempting to keep watch for any indication of a 
pending terrorist attack that might be directed against their own nations 
and national interests.
The global "war on terrorism" may have been a poor azimuth for the 
desired objectives of the post-9/11 era, but terrorism itself and the use of 
terrorist tactics were—and still are—pernicious problems. Efforts to focus 
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on radicalization and radical ideologies in order to get ahead of the terror-
ism problem, however, faced a serious challenge: Most radicals did not 
(and do not) engage in terrorism, and many terrorists did not (and do 
not) "radicalize" in any traditional sense.
Adherence to radical beliefs is not irrelevant to countering terrorism or 
advancing broader global security interests, but fanatically embracing an 
ideology is neither a proxy for, nor a necessary precursor to, terrorism. 
Conflating the two concepts undermines our ability to effectively counter 
either of them. As John Horgan has so cogently argued, we need to be less 
focused on why people engage in terrorism and more focused on how 
they become involved.1 That's the context for the articles in this special 
issue of JSS.
The issue begins with a two-part review of what is currently known about 
radicalization as it relates to terrorism. The first part surveys a range of 
definitions and ways that radicalization has been conceptualized by aca-
demics and law enforcement analysts. It goes on to suggest some poten-
tially promising theories that might support further study of the processes 
and mechanisms of radicalization into violent extremism.
In a sense, the article attempts to recast the popular notion of radicaliza-
tion. I use the term—perhaps unadvisedly—"radicalization into violent 
extremism" (RVE) to refer to the array of processes by which people come 
to adopt beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it, and how they 
progress—or not—from thinking to action.2
The second part reviews recent (post-9/11) conceptual models of the radi-
calization process and recent (post-9/11) empirical studies of RVE. Each 
model, I conclude, remains underdeveloped; none of them yet has a very 
firm social-scientific basis as an established "cause" of terrorism, and few 
of them have been subjected to any rigorous scientific or systematic 
inquiry.
I use the familiar term radicalization to refer to the process of developing 
extremist ideologies and beliefs, and the term action pathways (or action 
scripts) to describe the process of being involved in terrorism or engaging 
in violent extremist actions. I intend for the distinction between these 
concepts to acknowledge that "radicalizing" by developing or adopting 
extremist beliefs is but one of many possible pathways into terrorism 
involvement, and that the broader question is how people become 
involved, stay involved, and sometimes disengage from terrorism.
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What makes this issue "special," however, is the collection of articles that 
follows these reviews. It is a great privilege to include here contributions 
from some wonderful, internationally known scholars in areas that are 
analogous, or in some way related, to terrorism involvement, but who do 
not necessarily regard themselves as "terrorism studies" researchers. 
Each author has years of experience in his or her own field of inquiry, and 
may be less encumbered by the conventions of terrorism-related research. 
I asked each of them if they might reflect on what lessons they have 
learned in their own areas of research that might be useful for the study of 
RVE or involvement in terrorism. Their insights are well worth reading.
Scott Decker is one of the world's leading researchers on youth gangs. He 
and David Pyrooz point out that while the factors explaining gang involve-
ment and terrorism involvement may differ, commonalities among the 
collective structures, dynamics, and processes might be mutually infor-
mative. Organizational structure, they have found, affects three categories 
of activity: recruitment and joining, group process, and desistance. They 
address the instrumental and symbolic (e.g., revenge, peer affiliation, 
etc.) benefits that draw people in, evolving patterns of leadership, and the 
emerging roles of the Internet and technology. Importantly, one of their 
key conclusions is that "groups do not have to radicalize to be dangerous 
or of concern."
Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder study post-conflict reconstruc-
tion and reintegration of former combatants, including child soldiers. 
They begin by observing that ideological radicalization is much less com-
mon and less prominent among child soldiers who are coopted in civil 
conflicts than it is among terrorists. They explore the array of "push" and 
"pull" factors—both material and affiliative—that affect recruitment into 
armed conflict. They note that, even after completing a reintegration pro-
gram, many youth are re-recruited, which they believe is caused by a mis-
alignment between youth motivations and the imposed outcomes of 
reintegration. They stress the need for youth to find nonviolent social and 
political identities in post-conflict environments, and argue that families 
and communities are often critical ingredients for success.
Remy Cross and David Snow consider radicalism within the context of 
social movements. They distinguish among three types of radicalism: 
"practice of high-risk or extreme movement activity, the process by which 
activists become radicals, or an identity ascribed to those activists who 
may or may not already be radicalized." They suggest that grassroots 
social movements often serve as "free spaces" where people can explore 
and solidify an identity that is dissonant with mainstream culture, and 
insulate themselves from outside control or influence. That environment 
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facilitates bonds of trust among small collectives of activists, known as 
affinity groups. They go on to outline four common types of radicals—
opportunistic, coordinated, militant and loners—all of whom endorse 
high-risk activism, but who often have differing characteristics and follow 
different pathways.
Sara Savage has produced, over the years, some exceptionally thoughtful 
work studying fundamentalism and the psychology of religion. Based on 
that experience, she offers here four key lessons for the study of terrorism 
involvement, and even introduces evidence for a promising intervention. 
Lesson 1: Expect that sacred worldviews will be defended. She invokes 
findings from The Fundamentalism Project showing systematic common-
alities among very different fundamentalisms and ideologically driven 
religious movements. Lesson 2: Avoid overgeneralizing—with a special 
caution about characterizing "fundamentalism" in religions like Islam. 
Lesson 3: Simple explanatory models will not suffice—Much like the evo-
lution of ideas in the psychology of terrorism, Savage notes that early 
study of fundamentalism in the psychology of religion was marked by a 
search for aberrant mental or personality traits to explain the phenome-
non. Lesson 4: Words rule—The authority of most fundamentalisms rest 
on a foundation of some scripture, regarded as inerrant, that is inter-
preted by believers and then held out as "objective" truth. She concludes 
with a fascinating description of an intervention to enhance "integrative 
complexity" as a way to counter the "us vs. them" mentality among funda-
mentalist radicals.
Finally, economic sociologists Marco Goli and Shahamak Rezaei 
empirically examine the question of whether the failure of Muslim 
immigrants to integrate into a Western democratic society is linked to 
militant Islamists beliefs, which they call "Radical Islamism." Using a 
nationally representative sample of 1,113 young (ages fifteen–thirty) 
people in Denmark with national ties to a "Muslim country," their results 
do not support the idea that failed integration in a Western nation is a 
major cause of radicalism, or that Muslim radicals integrate more poorly 
there than non-radicals. They explored a wide range of factors associated 
with sociocultural integration and compared them across a spectrum of 
four ideological groups, with Group One representing non-radical 
Muslims, and Group Four representing the Radical Islamists. They found 
few, if any, significant differences.
Instead of viewing radicalization as a proxy for—or as a necessary precur-
sor to—terrorism, my hope is that the collection of papers here may stim-
ulate a greater focus on the broader issue of terrorism involvement. 
Terrorism—regardless of which of the hundred definitions we use—is a 
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moving target. It is also, of course, a tactic, not a discrete enemy. But as a 
tactic, terrorism's character has changed and is continuing to change. 
This is not simply a change in the weapons or devices being used, but in 
who is using the tactic of terrorism, for what purpose, and to what effect.
Some of the conventions that have served us well in the past—if left unex-
amined—may constrain and impede our future progress in countering 
terrorism and violent extremism. The ideas, for example, that terrorism is 
best viewed as an expression of political violence; that terrorism is neces-
sarily a group-related phenomenon; or that terrorism should be defined 
by the actor's intent to influence a government, or specifically to cause 
fear among a broader population, all may be negotiable in a twenty-first 
century environment. I hope that the thoughtful contributions offered in 
this volume will stimulate some reflection and critical thinking about the 
concept of radicalization and about terrorism's evolving character.
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